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Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: 
The New Monetary Sanctions for the 
"S top-and-Think-Again" Rule 
Jeffrey A. Parness' 
Since 1983, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which deals with frivolous litigation papers, has 
prompted much controversy, satellite litigation, and a new 
cottage industry. Rule amendments in 1983 increased both the 
range of sanctionable attorney conduct and the extent of 
judicial sanctioning authority. By the latter 1980s, many had 
concluded that further amendments were warranted. Recent 
case law, commentary and empirical research have culminated 
in a proposed new rule forwarded by the U.S. Supreme Court 
t o  Congress in April 1993 and scheduled to take effect in 
December 1993. In part, the 1993 rule reduces a party's 
incentives to pursue sanctions for frivolous papers since less 
misconduct will be sanctionable. Further, attorneys' fees will be 
less available as a sanction even when a violation occurs. 
Increasingly, other forms of sanctions, such as fines payable to  
the court, will be employed; these new forms raise very 
different questions than do the most common form of reported 
sanction under the 1983 r u l e a n  award of attorneys' fees. 
Although both fines and fees constitute monetary sanctions, 
fines are usually ordered with the public interest in mind while 
fees are awarded, at least in significant part, to promote 
private interests. The move from fees to fines presents new 
challenges for those concerned with Rule 11. This Article will 
review fines under the 1993 rule, finding that the new rule 
may best be characterized as a "Big-Brother-Says-Stop-and- 
Think-Again" rule-quite distinct from the "Stop-and-Think" 
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby 
College; J.D., University of Chicago. An early version of this paper was presented 
at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, on May 29, 1993 
in Chicago, Illinois. 
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A. Changes in Sanctionable Conduct and Sanctioning 
Authority in the 1980s and 1990s 
Pursuant to the August 1983 amendments to Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the signature of an attor- 
ney on a litigation paper constitutes a certification by the attor- 
ney that "to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry," the paper is "well grounded 
in fad."' If an attorney violates this standard, under the rule 
the trial court shall impose "an appropriate san~tion."~ Such a 
1. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 (underlined), together with the deleted , 
portions of the earlier (1938) rule (lined through), are as follows. They appear, 
together with the final Advisory Committee Notes, in Amendments to the Federal . 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 166, 196-201 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Amend- 
ments]. 
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an 
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individ- 
ual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented 
by an attorney shall sign his pleadink motion, or other paper and state 
his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or stat- 
ute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule 
in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome 
by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corrobo- 
rating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or 
other Paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is war- 
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifi- 
cation, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after 
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. eris 
. . S If a plead in^ motion, 
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion 
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an 
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the fding of the plead in^ motion, or other 
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
2. Id. at 197. 
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sanction is most often imposed on the attorney: and usually 
requires a monetary payment to help defray the opposing 
party's legal expenses. This sanction cannot be charged to the 
~ l i e n t . ~  
The 1983 amendments were intended to alter attorney 
conduct in order to "streamline the litigation process by lessen- 
ing frivolous claims or  defense^."^ The changes atere designed 
t o  make attorneys more responsible for shielding the federal 
courts from frivolous papers. While the 1983 rule requires 
attorneys to certify that papers are "well grounded in fact," 
the former rule, effective in 1938, required only certification as 
t o  "good ground.'" The 1983 amendments were thus intended 
t o  make the certification standard for attorneys "more strin- 
gent" and to  create an expectation "that a greater range of 
circumstances will trigger" violations of the signature rule.' 
The 1983 rule also expressly requires attorneys to under- 
take "some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law,77g 
while the 1938 rule contained no such explicit requirement.'' 
This addition of a prefiling duty led many to characterize the 
1983 rule as a "Stop-and-Think" rule." 
3. While the rule provides that a violation of the signature requirement may 
result in sanctions against "the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both," id., the federal courts are not disposed toward sanctioning a client for mis- 
conduct solely the responsibility of some attorney. See Cine Forty-Second St. 
Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1069 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(Oakes, J., concurring) ("It would be with the greatest reluctance, however, that I 
would visit upon the client the sins of counsel, absent client's knowledge, condo- 
nation, compliance, or causation."). 
4. See, e.g., Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 146 F.R.D. 142, 
145 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (fmding client financial responsibility "untenable"). 
5. 1983 Amendments, supra note 1, at  198 (Advisory Committee Note to 
1983 Rule 11). 
6. Id. at 197. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 198-99 (Advisory Committee Note to 1983 Rule 11). 
9. Id. at 198 (Advisory Committee Note to  1983 Rule 11). 
10. Id. at 197. While the phrase "formed after reasonable inquiry" was only 
added to Rule 11 in 1983, a few cases read a duty of inquiry into the former rule. 
See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (D.N.J. 1983); Kinee v. Abra- 
ham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 982-83 (E.D. Pa. 1973); 
Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
11. See, e-g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT 
AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 15 (Federal Judicial Center 1984) ("There is now a 
mandated obligation on the part of an attorhey to stop and think about his behav- 
ior, whether it is pleadings, motions, discovery, or what have you . . . ."). Miller 
. served as Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules which developed the 
1983 rule. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
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The 1983 amendments were also intended to  alter judicial 
conduct by making trial judges more responsible for ridding the 
courts of frivolous papers. The 1983 rule says judges "shall 
impose" sanctions for violations of the signature require- 
ment,12 whereas the 1938 rule provided only that attorneys 
"may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action."13 Addi- 
tionally, the 1983 rule requires sanctions for intentional and 
unintentional violations, while the 1938 rule permitted disci- 
plinary action only for willful violations.14 The 1983 amend- 
ments were said to stress "a deterrent orientation,"15 and were 
intended t o  focus "the court's attention on the need to  impose 
sanctions for . . . abuses."16 The only appropriate "sanction" 
mentioned in the 1983 rule was "an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses in- 
curred because of the filing. . . including a reasonable 
attorney's fee."" The 1938 rule failed to elaborate on, or illus- 
trate, what might constitute "appropriate" disciplinary action. 
The 1983 amendments regarding frivolous papers consti- 
tuted part of a broader judicialla and congressi~nal~~ effort 
aimed at deterring attorney misconduct. Much of the attention 
before 1983 centered on discovery abuse.20 Although empirical 
data was scarce:' the federal rulemakers in 1983 evidently 
believed that misconduct in the certification of litigation papers 
Procedure, 90 F.R.D. 451, 452 (1981) (containing the 1981 proposal which led to 
the 1983 rule). 
12. 1983 Amendments, supra note 1, at 197. The mandatory nature of the 
sanctioning authority did raise some concerns about judicial overreaching and con- 
gressional prerogative. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 
11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1009-11 (1983). 
13. 1983 Amendments, supra note 1, at  197. 
14. Id. a t  197. 
15. Id. at  199-200 (Advisory Committee Note to 1983 Rule 11). 
16. Id. at 200 (Advisory Committee Note to 1983 Rule 11). 
17. Id. at 197. 
18. Consider contemporary U.S. Supreme Court developments regarding the 
inherent power to sanction. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 
(1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-67 (1980). 
19. Consider the 1980 congressional amendment to 28 U.S.C. $ 1927 so that 
attorneys' fees may be assessed against attorneys who "unreasonably and vexa- 
tiously" multiply proceedings. 28 U.S.C. $ 1927 (1988). 
20. For a review of contemporary reports on discovery abuse, see Amend- 
ments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 997-1001 (1980) (Powell, 
J., dissenting). 
21. Jeffrey A. Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifjring Attorneys in the 
Federal Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325, 327 m.5. 
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filed in civil cases undermined "the just, speedy, and inexpen- 
sive determination of every [civil] action."22 The 1983 amend- 
ments were intended to stimulate more fair, prompt and afford- 
able dispute resolution by reducing problems caused by frivo- 
lous papers. 
Not only was the 1983 rule heavily criticized a t  the outset, 
but new critics emerged within a few years of its promulga- 
t i o d 3  In fact, the 1983 amendments produced so much litera- 
ture and litigation that in 1990 some federal rulemakers issued 
a "call for written comments"24 on the recent Rule 11 experi- 
ence. Many of the respondents stated25 that  application of the 
rule discriminated against certain lawyers or parties, while 
others claimed that the procedures employed in sanctioning 
were deficient. Additionally, the 1983 rule was deemed too 
expensive by some, who viewed the resulting costs in satellite 
litigation as exceeding any benefits. Further, there was concern 
over the "incremental injury to the civility of litigation that  
results from lawyers impugning one another's motives and 
professionalism, and seeking to impose burdens directly on one 
another."26 
The 1990 call for comments was followed by a series of 
proposed amendments to Rule 11 beginning in August 1991,2' 
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
23. See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARv. L. REV. 
1013, 1013 (1988) (focusing on two problems with the 1983 rule: "the lack of pre- 
dictability of the standard of compliance and the excessive amount of litigation the 
rule generates"). 
24. Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Civil Proce- 
dure and Related Rules as Amended in 1983, 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990) [hereinafter 
Call for Comments]. 
25. With the assistance (much appreciated) of the federal. rulemakers' st&, 
the author reviewed all written correspondence relevant to the 1990 call on May 
13, 1993 in Washington, D.C. Another who reviewed the correspondence has said: 
"More than 125 individuals and groups provided written comments . . . . The prin- 
cipal objections were that the Rule was fostering excessive, costly satellite litiga- 
tion, that judges were inconsistently implementing the provision, that Rule 11 
activity was disadvantaging civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, and that the Rule 
was eroding civility among lawyers." Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. 
MMI L. REV. 855, 862-63 (1992). The Advisory Committee, which triggered the 
call for comments, also issued a report detailing its findings upon review of the 
responsive correspondence and testimony. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Com- 
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Interim Report on Rule 11 (1991) [hereinafter Interim Report], reprinted in 
GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND -EN- 
TIVE MEASURES, at  1-3 (App. I) (2d ed. 1992). 
26. Call for Comments, supra note 24, at 346. 
27. Preliminary DraR of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
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which resulted in the 1993 rule.28 
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) [hereinafter 
1991 Draft] (including Advisory Committee Notes for the 1991 Draft). 
28. The proposed 1993 amendments to Rule 11, together with the Advisory 
Committee Notes for the 1993 rule, appear in Amendments to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 419-24, 577-92 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Amend- 
ments]. The 1993 rule is as follows: 
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representa- 
tions to Court; Sanctions 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall 
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual 
name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed 
by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone 
number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or 
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An 
unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is cor- 
rected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or 
party. (b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by 
signing, fding, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, 
or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to 
the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after 
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are war- 
ranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary sup- 
port or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence 
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of informa- 
tion or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, aRer notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, 
the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court 
may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanc- 
tion upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivi- 
sion (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(1) How Initiated. 
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific 
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided 
in Rule 5, but shall not be fled with or presented to the court unless, 
within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the 
court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, 
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If war- 
ranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the 
reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing 
the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held 
jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and 
employees. 
FINES UNDER NEW RULE 11 
The 1993 rule "is intended to remedy problems that have 
arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983 revi- 
~ion."~' For example, the new rule removes the restrictive in- 
terpretation of Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment 
Group," so that trial courts may sanction the law firms of 
attorneys who present frivolous  paper^.^' Additionally, the 
new rule seeks "to equalize the burden of the rule upon plain- 
tiffs and  defendant^."^^ 
Generally, the 1993 rule "places greater constraints on the 
imposition of sanctions"33 for rule violations by affording those 
most subject t o  possible sanctions an opportunity to take cor- 
rective action. This corrective action should typically occur 
within at least 21 days after the opposing party gives particu- 
larized notice of concern about alleged violations." The 
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter 
an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivi- 
sion (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why 
it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation 
of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of 
such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject 
to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist 
of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a 
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of 
the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct 
result of the violation. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented 
party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative 
unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dis- 
missal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, 
or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the con- 
duct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the 
basis for the sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this 
rule do not apply t o  disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objec- 
tions, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 
37. 
29. Id. at 583 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11). 
30. 493 US. 120 (1989) (holding the 1983 rule does not permit sanctions 
against law firms, but only against the individual signer). 
31. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 581-82 (Rule 11 (c)(l)(A) and 
(c)(l)(B)); id. at  588-89 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11). 
32. Id. at 586 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11). 
33. Id. at 584 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11). 
34. While the 1993 rule indicates a motion for sanctions should be filed no 
less than 21 days after the motion is served and no corrective action has been 
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rulemakers contemplate a reduction in satellite litigation, be- 
cause many violations are expected to be withdrawn or correct- 
ed within the 21-day "safe harbor"35 period. Motions for sanc- 
tions can be made only against those who have been provided 
the safe harbor. Thus, while the 1983 rulemakers encouraged 
attorneys to stop and think before signing litigation papers, the 
1993 rulemakers allow many alleged violators to  stop and 
think again after their frivolous papers have already been pre- 
sented. 
Simultaneously, the 1993 rule broadens the range of those 
ultimately responsible for frivolous papers. Some newer forms 
of Rule 11 violations are created, such as violations by law 
Further, the 1993 rule replaces the signature require- 
ment with a mandate that papers be properly "present[ed] to 
the ~ourt. '"~ This new duty broadens the range of those indi- 
viduals accountable for frivolous papers by including within 
presentations not only "signing," but also "filing, submitting, or 
later advo~ating."~~ 
Violations of the 1993 rule, even those surviving the safe 
harbor period, no longer automatically trigger an appropriate 
sanction. Rather, sanction decisions are left to the "signifiicant 
discretion" of the trial court.39 Further, the 1993 rule contem- 
plates that every sanction "shall be limited to what is sufficient 
to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by 
others similarly ~ituated,'"~ so that compensation is not the 
primary motivator. The 1993 rule expressly recognizes as ap- 
propriate sanctions "directives of a nonmonetary nature, an 
order to pay a penalty into court, or .  . . an order directing 
payment to  the movant of some or all of the reasonable 
attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of 
the ~iolation."~ 
taken, a lengthier time period can be anticipated "in most cases" because counsel 
should normally give "informal" notice of concern about alleged frivolous papers 
even before a Rule 11 motion is prepared. Id. at 591 (Advisory Committee Note to 
1993 Rule 11). 
35. Id. (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11 indicate parties will no 
longer be "reluctant to abandon a questionable contention lest that be viewed as 
evidence of a violation of Rule 11."). 
36. Id. at  588-89 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11 indicate the 
change to law firm responsibilities.). 
37. Id. at 579 (Rule ll(b)). 
38. Id. at 579 (Rule ll(b)). 
39. Id. at 587 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11). 
40. Id. at 582 (Rule ll(c)(2)). 
41. Id. Sanctions involving "directives of a nonmonetary nature" include court 
FINES UNDER NEW RULE 11 
While the 1993 rule should reduce the number of motions 
seeking Rule 11 sanctions because the safe harbor period will 
frequently be used, it should also prompt a greater number of 
court-initiated inquiries into so-called public interest sanctions 
against lawyers. These sanctions are expressly recognized un- 
der the new rule."2 They also provide a vehicle for judges to 
address intentional and unintentional misconduct of lawyers 
before them, even when no private party complains. 
One of the more significant forms of public interest sanc- 
tions, expressly recognized in the new rule, is a monetary as- 
sessment involving penalties paid into court.43 While such 
penalties were occasionally ordered under the 1983 rule:4 and 
perhaps under its predece~sor,"~ their recognition under the 
new rule should trigger at least a small cottage industry. Seem- 
ingly, under the 1993 rule, fines against lawyers can be ordered 
for many forms of Rule 11 violations, even where the miscon- 
duct is withdrawn or corrected soon after concern is expressed 
by either an adverse party (via the notice preceding any mo- 
tion) or by the judge (via a "show cause" order).46 The 
aforenoted safe harbor is available chiefly for rule violators 
seeking to avoid fee awards. Because attorneys' fees may only 
be awarded when other sanctions provide "ineffective" deter- 
rence4' and after time has been allotted for the withdrawal or 
orders "striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; 
requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs; . . . [and] refer- 
ring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys, 
to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head)." Id. at  587 (Advisory 
Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11). 
42. Id. at 582 (Rule ll(c)(l)(B)). 
43. Id. (Rule ll(c)(2)). 
44. VAIRO, supra note 25, at 9-53 to 9-62 (reviewing cases); see also Jeffrey A. 
Parness, More Stringent Sanctions Under Federal Civil Rule 11: A Reply to Profes- 
sor Nelken, 75 GEO. L.J. 1937 (1987) (urging that the 1983 rule should not be read 
to proscribe monetary sanctions in excess of a party's costs and fees). 
45. While there may have been no reported cases of fines under the 1938 
rule, D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Strik- 
ing" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-37 
(1976) (reviewing reported cases), the availability of "punitiven fines was recognized 
by a t  least some commentators, id. at 43. 
46. Specifically, the 1993 rule allows court initiatives on all rule violations, 
1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 582 (Rule 11 (c)(lXB)), whether or not cor- 
rected during the safe harbor period, and only disallows court initiatives regarding 
monetary sanctions if voluntary dismissal or settlement has occurred, id. at 583 
(Rule 11 (c)(2)(B)), thus seemingly permitting nonmonetary sanctions (such as bar 
disciplinary referrals) against attorneys who have corrected their frivolous papers. . 
47. Id. at 587-88 (Advisory Committee Note t o  1993 Rule 11). There is no 
explanation of why fines payable to  the court are more effective deterrents of Rule 
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correction of the misconduct, motions for fees under the 1993 
rule should be filed with the court far less freq~ently.~' Thus, 
fines should constitute the chief form of monetary sanction 
under the 1993 rule:' typically coming after a court has taken 
"initiative," not after a party's motion. And, there is good rea- 
son to believe fines will often be chosen over other nonmone- 
tary sanctions available against lawyers.50 Initiatives regard- 
ing fines may be difficult, however, because private parties 
have little incentive to inform the court about much Rule 11 
misconduct, especially if it has been withdrawn or corrected. 
Under the 1993 rule, such withdrawn or corrected misconduct 
has been the subject of an earlier notice of concern served upon 
the parties, but not "filed with or presented to the court."' 
11 misconduct than awards of attorneys' fees. Perhaps the federal rulemakers 
found that the lure of attorneys' fees caused excessive Rule 11 motions and thus 
too much satellite litigation, and that federal judges could be trusted to detect and 
act wisely regarding significant Rule 11 misconduct, even though the injured party 
might not help much since there is little incentive to move for sanctions. Given the 
1990 Call for Comments, supra note 24, at 347 (soliciting evidence), and the vary- 
ing studies of the 1983 rule employed by the 1993 rulemakers, 1993 Amendments, 
supra note 28, at 583-84 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule ll), the decision 
to abandon fee awards may have been undertaken with an "empirical approach." 
Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 455, 484-85 (1993) (direct observation and experience used). Yet, the 
decision to move to fines as a chief means of deterrence seems grounded on the 
rulemakers' (more frequently employed) "rationalistic approach," as there was little 
examination of (or experimentation with) fines. Id. at 484-88 (rationalistic approach 
employs reason and intuition alone); infia notes 55-92 and accompanying text (re- 
view of 1993 rulemakers' consideration of fines and of information on fines supplied 
to the rulemakers). 
48. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 584 (Advisory Committee Note to 
1993 Rule 11). Motions for fees most typically will be made where frivolous papers 
remain unwithdrawn or uncorrected after concern is expressed by the movant and 
where those papers were presented for improper purposes, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Id. at 588 
(Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11 find fees most appropriate for the "un- 
usual" circumstance of a Rule ll(bX1) violation). Compare the proposed amend- 
ments to the discovery rules, which permit fees for discovery abuse where there is 
no improper purpose. Id. at  684-85 (Rule 37 (aX4)(A)). 
49. "Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to com- 
pensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordi- 
narily be paid into murt as a penalty." Id. at 587-88 (Advisory Committee Note to 
1993 Rule 11). 
50. On the available nonmonetary sanctions, see id. at 582 (Rule 11 (c)(2)). 
On why fines often are more effective than these other sanctions, see Stephen G. 
Ben& Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys? An Economic Approach to Lawyer Discipline 
Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907 (1991) (stating that fines are preferable to other 
sanctions in many attorney discipline situations). 
51. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at  581 (Rule ll(cX1XA)). 
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The reduction in Rule 11 motions and the increase in Rule 11 
court initiatives will signal a move from a time when opposing 
counsel often inquires into whether an attorney reasonably 
stopped and thought before filing, to a time when the govern- 
ment, as the public representative, frequently asks whether an 
attorney reasonably stopped and thought again after being put 
on notice of an opposing party's concern. 
The procedural mechanisms and substantive criteria rele- 
vant to fines, a public interest sanction, vary dramatically from 
the guidelines for awards of attorneys' fees, a private interest 
sanction. While both may provide a remedy for similar litiga- 
tion misconduct, the purposes behind public and private inter- 
est sanctions are typically quite different and thus the nature 
of remedial relief chosen is usually quite different.52 Public 
interest sanctions are most often intended to address the harm 
caused the public at large, while private interest sanctions are 
intended, in significant part at least, to address the harm 
caused particular individuals or entities; thus, public interest 
sanctions are usually considered at the urging of a public rep- 
resentative, while private interest sanctions are typically re- 
quested by certain individuals or entities who have been 
harmed. In considering harm to the public caused by civil liti- 
gation misconduct, the public representative is often most in- 
terested in protecting scarce governmental resources, general 
deterrence, quasi-criminal punishment, and professional disci- 
pline. The same misconduct causes a private party to  focus on 
gaining compensation for personal loss, specific deterrence, and 
perhaps punitive damages (possibly constituting a windfall). 
Public interest sanctions for civil litigation misconduct are 
frequently raised and adjudicated by judges on their own initia- 
tive upon evidence of especially egregious behavior, with these 
judges then left in the somewhat uncomfortable position of 
performing both executive and judicial functions. These judges 
may also need to undertake legislative functions where the 
guidelines for public interest sanctions are unclear, and to 
serve as witnesses when the misconduct occurred in their pres- 
ence or when the reasonable person standard is applicable. By 
contrast, private interest sanctions for litigation misconduct are 
52. For a general discussion of public and private interest sanctions under 
the 1983 rule, see Jeffrey A. Parness, The New Method of Regulating Lawyers: 
Public and Private Interest Sanctions During Civil Litigation for Attorney Miscon- 
drict, 47 LA. L. REV. 1305 (1987). 
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frequently urged in adversarial settings where judges can re- 
main more disinterested. In sum, there are very different fac- 
tors utilized when public representatives and private parties 
raise concerns over the very same civil litigation misconduct. 
Under the 1993 rule and its legislative history, a variety of 
forms of public interest sanctions beyond fines are contemplat- 
ed. They include an admonition, a reprimand or a censure; an 
order requiring participation in an educational program; and a 
disciplinary referral.53 The noted private interest sanctions 
under the 1993 rule include an order striking an offending pa- 
per and a fee award.54 
B. The Intent Behind the Push for More Public Interest 
Sanctions in the 1990s 
What prompted the federal rulemakers to encourage more 
public interest sanctions against lawyers? The rulemakers 
seemed chiefly concerned with cha~e l ing  attention away from 
compensation and toward deterrence, with assuring fair appli- 
cation of Rule 11, with reducing satellite litigation, and with 
restoring judicial discretion in the imposition of sanctions. The 
rulemakers rejected the urging of many that the rule be re- 
turned to its pre-1983 form (or to something comparable), so 
that only willful violations would be addressed and so that a 
disciplinary action would be the sole sanction. Trial judges 
retain the power under the 1993 rule t o  remedy both intention- 
al and unintentional actions through a variety of remedies. 
While the goals of the 1993 rule are somewhat clear, the 
particular ways in which public interest sanctions will serve 
these goals are far from clear. Certainly, the newly recognized 
authority of district judges to issue "show cause" orders on 
their own "initiative" invites greater consideration of public 
interest sanctions. To support the call for more public interest 
sanctions, the federal rulemakers also referred to  the Manual 
for Complex Litigation when discussing "the variety of possible 
sanctions."55 The Manual does include within its recognized 
"types of sanctions" the imposition of a "fine."56 Yet, the Man- 
ual does not say much about when fines are most appropriate. 
53. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 587 (Advisory Committee Note to 
1993 Rule 11): 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 5 42.3 (2d ed. 1985). 
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The Manual does say that in imposing any sanction, a court 
should consider "the nature of the sanctionable conduct, its 
consequences on others, and the purposes to  be served by a 
san~tion."~' The drafters of the 1993 rule otherwise give little 
guidance on how district judges will determine when public 
interest sanctions might be considered, which of the possible 
public interest sanctions is most appropriate, or when relevant 
misconduct has even occurred. Further, injured parties and 
opposing lawyers have little incentive, and no widely recog- 
nized duty, to inform the court about the misconduct of others, 
so district judges will often have difficulty learning of Rule 11 
violations. 
Before deciding to  encourage more public interest sanc- 
tions, particularly fines, in the 1993 rule, the federal 
rulemakers did consider the responses to  the 1990 call for com- 
ments, as well as prior case law and commentaries on the 1983 
rule.58 Only a few of the responses to its 1990 call, however, 
addressed fines payable to the court; none mentioned the Man- 
ual for Complex Litigation; and few discussed in any detail the 
procedural or substantive guidelines for fines.59 
The American College of Trial LawyersG0 recommended in 
October 1990 certain amendments to the 1983 rule, including a 
proposal that a frivolous paper could prompt an order for pay- 
ment of "the amount of reasonable expenses, not to include 
attorneys' fees, incurred" because of the rule ~iolation.~' This 
order might be accompanied by "an additional monetary sanc- 
t i ~ n , ' ~ ~  with all "monetary sanctions" to be "paid into the reg- 
istry account of the clerk of the district court."G3 
57. Id. 
58. Prior to 1990, a slowly emerging body of cases appeared which supported 
fines under the 1983 rule and other sanctions authority. See infia notes 93-104 
and accompanying text. Earlier commentary supporting greater consideration of 
fines includes Parness, supm note 21, at 354 ("Cost recovery by the government 
should constitute part of the trial court's sanctioning arsenal pursuant to Rule 11 
because there are times when no other sanctions may be effective."). 
59. With the assistance (much appreciated) of the federal rulemakers' staff, 
the author reviewed all written correspondence relevant to the 1990 call on May 
13, 1993 in Washington, D.C. Of course, the responses to the 1990 call do not 
constitute the legislative intent behind the 1993 rule, Bancorp Leasing & Fin. 
Corp. v. Augusta Aviation, 813 F.2d 272, 276 (9th Cir. 1987), but they are evi- 
dence of what the rulemakers were thinking when proposing the rule. 
60. Letter from American College of Trial Lawyers to Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (Oct. 28, 1990) (copy on file with author). 
61. Id., Addendum 2, at 2. 
62. Id. 
63. Id., Addendum 2, at 3. In rejecting the possibility of attorneys' fees, the 
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In the fall of 1990, the Chicago Council of Lawyerse4 also 
urged that new forms of sanctions be expressly recognized. 
Specifically, the Council sought an amendment to "make clear 
that a non-monetary sanction is a legitimate form of sanction 
under the urging that Rule 11 should expressly recog- 
nize a reprimand? 
In the f d  of 1990, the Chicago Bar AssociationB7 urged 
that "greater consideration be given to non-monetary sanctions" 
under Rule 11." Its proposal contemplated that no attorneys' 
fees be awarded unless other sanctions were "insuMicient to  
deter future violations and that the amount of the sanction is 
the least severe sufficient to  deter future  violation^.'*^ Besides 
attorneys' fees, the sanctions endorsed by the Association in- 
cluded continuing legal education; the use of unpublished, rath- 
er than published, opinions; and the requirement that law 
f m s  "institute internal approval procedures to  assure that 
future filings comply with the rule."70 
Like the Chicago associations, the National Bar Associa- 
tion71 asked federal rulemakers to  direct more attention to 
nonmonetary sanctions. On behalf of a membership heavily 
involved in federal civil rights l i t igat i~n,~~ the Association sug- 
gested that federal judges be "encouraged to  utilize i~ova t ive  
approaches as a preferred deterrence to  monetary sanctions in 
light of the dearth of attorneys who choose to practice civil 
rights law and the unprofitability of practicing civil rights 
College characterized "whether or not the sanctioned person should pay the 
opponent's legal fees" as a close question. Id. at 4. The College stood by its Octo- 
ber 1990 proposal after an early version of the 1993 rule was issued about a year 
later. See Letter from American College of Trial Lawyers to Secretary, Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Nov. 14, 1991) (copy on file with author). 
64. Letter from Chicago Council of Lawyers to Committee on Rules of Prac- 
tice and Procedure (Nov. 1990) (copy on file with author). 
65. Id. at 3. 
66. Id. 
67. Comment of the Chicago Bar Association, Submitted to Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States 
(Nov. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Comment of Chicago Bar] (copy on file with author). 
68. Id. at 12. 
69. Id. at 2. 
70. Id. at 12. 
71. Rule 11 and Civil Rights Lawyers: Comments of National Bar Association 
in Response to Call for Comments Issued by the Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules, Judicial Conference of the United States (Nov. 1, 1990) (copy on file with 
author). 
72. Id. at 1. 
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law."73 Possible approaches were said to  include private and 
public reprimands, referrals to state disciplinary bodies, attor- 
ney license suspensions, and required legal ed~cation.?~ 
At the same time, Professor Victor H. Kra~ner?~ urged 
that Rule 11 be rewritten so that it would serve as "an instru- 
ment to  improve professional respon~ibility"~~ and thus be- 
come "primarily a lawyer discipline device."?? He suggested 
that a new rule include as an appropriate sanction "an order to 
pay to the clerk of the court a civil penalty . . . in the nature of 
a which would serve to "compensate the courts for 
causing them to engage in needless expense arising from frivo- 
lous litigati~n."~~ 
A few other professors joined in the fall of 1990 in urging 
the move from fees to  fmes or from private to public interest 
sanctions. Professors Dennis Curtin and Judith Resnick indi- 
cated their understanding that this move was "emerging" as a 
"central" recommendati~n.~~ They supported the move, indi- 
cating it would "reduce the amount of monetary fines im- 
posed"" and could provide "money. . . either for continuing 
legal education or for the provision of legal services to pro se 
 litigant^?^ They suggested fines be "limited" in amounts3 
and should only come after other public interest sanctions, 
including "mandatory legal education," were considered?* 
And, Professor John Leubsdorf urged federal rulemakers "to 
73. Id. at 12. 
74. Id. at 14-15. 
75. Letter from Professor Victor H. 
School, to Committee on Rules of Practice 
file with author). 
76. Id. at 4. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 5. 
Kramer, University of Minnesota Law 
and Procedure (Oct. 23, 1990) (copy on 
79. Id. at 5-6. He hrther urged that each federal district "should adopt a 
local rule to  provide that every violation of Rule 11 by a lawyer will be reported 
to the disciplinary authority in the state in which the offending lawyer both has 
been authorized to practice law and has his own principal ofice." Id. at  4. For a 
hrther elaboration of Professor Kramer's views, see Victor H. Kramer, Viewing 
Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 793 
(1991). 
80. Letter from Professors 
Southern California Law Center, 
(copy on file with author). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
Dennis Curtis & Judith Resnick, University of 
to The Honorable Sam Pointer 2 (Nov. 21, 1990) 
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replace the present discretionary sanctioning provisions" of 
Rule 11 "with a requirement of fixed but relatively small law- 
yer  fine^.'"^ This would drive the sanctioning scheme toward 
deterrence and away from compen~at ion,~~ and "provide pro- 
tection against sanctions that are unfairly large."87 
Between publication of the proposed amendments to Rule 
11 in August 1991 and the communication of the 1993 rule by 
the U.S. Supreme Court to Congress in April 1993, others 
joined in supporting the move from private to public interest 
sanctions.88 But they too have provided little assistance on the 
procedural or substantive criteria which should guide the impo- 
sition of increasing numbers of fines and other public interest 
sanctions. For example, a bench-bar proposal to revise Rule 11 
was issued by a distinguished group of judges and lawyers 
shortly aRer the August 1991 proposed amendments to Rule 11 
appeared.89 That proposal recommended that the sole Rule 11 
sanction be an "appropriate" monetary payment "into the regis- 
try account of the clerk of the district court."g0 While the pro- 
ponents indicated their provision was "taken directly fkom the 
proposal of the American College of Trial Lawyers,"' they 
failed to indicate why they rejected the College's proposal al- 
lowing recovery of a private party's expenses, not including 
attorneys' fees.g2 
85. Letter from John Leubsdorf, Visiting Professor, Columbia University 
School of Law, to Professor Paul Carrington 1 (Nov. 16, 1990) (copy on fde with 
author). 
86. Id. at 2. 
87. Id. 
88. Of course, many who found fault with the 1983 rule criticized the 1991 
proposal, including its projected move from fees to fines. See, e-g., Carl Tobias, 
Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 
1793 (1992) (suggesting a prohibition of all monetary sanctions). Since the 1993 
rule was sent to Congress, much of the criticism of the Rule 11 proposal has abat- 
ed. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, New Rule in Need of Trial Run, NAT'L L.J., June 21, 
1993, at  15, 16 (urging Congress to allow the 1993 rule to take effect). Yet, signifi- 
cant criticism of changes in the discovery rules, which accompanied the 1993 rule 
to  Congress, continues. Id.; Randall Samborn, Derailing the Rules, NAT'L L.J., May 
24, 1993, at  1, 33. 
89. Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil Procedure Rule 11, 137 F.R.D. 159 
(1991) (the proposal was submitted by three federal circuit judges, six lawyers and 
a law professor) [hereinafter Bench-Bar Proposal]. For a more complete comparison 
of the Bench-Bar Proposal with the amendments to Rule 11 circulated in 1991 and 
found in 1991 Draft, supra note 27, see Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are 
and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 495-501 (1991). 
90. Bench-Bar Proposal, supra note 89, at 165. 
91. Id. at 169. 
92. Id. The College viewed the availability of attorneys9 fees under Rule 11 as 
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In sum, the 1993 version of Federal Civil Rule 11 should 
prompt fewer motions seeking attorneys' fees, but more court 
initiatives regarding alleged attorney misconduct. There should 
be a greater number of fines. Yet, the federal judges will need 
to develop on a case-by-case basis, and perhaps through local 
rules, the procedural mechanisms and substantive criteria for 
fines and other public interest sanctions since the rulemakers 
have provided little guidance. When fines have been ordered 
under the 1938 and 1983 rules, the results often were both 
unfair and uneven. This history further challenges the judges 
responsible for implementing the 1993 rule. 
111. FINES UNDER THE OLD AND NEW RULE 11 
While the 1993 rule encourages fines, orders of penalties 
paid to the court were occasionally issued under the earlier 
versions of Rule 11. After this experience is described, fines 
under the new rule will be explored. 
A. Fines Under the Old Rule 11 
As noted, the 1938 version of Rule 11 covered only willful 
violations, which, when found, might only subject an attorney 
"to appropriate disciplinary action."g3 By comparison, the 1983 
version contemplated both willful and nonwillful violations, 
which, when found, must trigger "an appropriate sanction," 
exemplified only by an order requiring the reimbursement of 
"reasonable expenses . . . including a reasonable attorney's 
fee."94 Assuming comparable willful violations, both versions 
of the rule seemingly allowed a fine as a form of "appropriate" 
sanction, and the 1983 rule may have allowed fines even for 
certain forms of nonwillful conduct.95 Yet neither rule man- 
dated, encouraged, or generated many fines. In the last few 
years, however, the 1983 rule, together with comparable rules 
on dis~ove$~ and appellate pra~tice,~' have prompted a 
a close question. Supra note 63. 
93. 1983 Amendments, supra note 1, at 197. 
94. Id. 
95. See, e.g., Pravic v. United States 1ndus.-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620, 623-24 
(E.D. Mich. 1986) (ordering fme paid to court for unreasonable conduct in failing to 
make inquiry). 
96. See, e.g., Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.R.D. 57, 67 (E.D. Mich. 1987) 
(ordering fine under civil discovery rule to cover some of taxpayers' costs due to 
plaintiff's intentional disobedience). 
97. See, e.g., In re Pritzker, 762 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1985) (using Federal Rules 
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slowly growing number of federal court fines. The predominant 
legal issues raised have concerned process, not the guiding 
substantive criteria. 
Both casesg8 and commentariesg9 have addressed the 
need for notice, opportunity to be heard, and articulated find- 
ings when fines are ordered under Rule 11. Typically, fines 
have occurred in settings where at least one private party 
moved for attorneys' fees and a fine was ordered during a rul- 
ing on the motion; often the fme was not requested by the 
movant, and the possibility of a fine was never raised by the 
court prior to its ruling.100 Occasionally, fmes have been or- 
dered after "show cause" orders were served.lol 
Usually, fines under the 1983 rule were imposed only upon 
findings of willful violations. Such fines have taken two forms: 
compensatory and punitive. Compensatory fmes usually seek to 
reimburselo2 the judiciary for at least some, if not all,lo3 of 
of Appellate Procedure 46(c)); Robert J. Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncer- 
tain Federal Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845, 868 (noting fines have been levied 
based on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c), recognizing "appropriate disci- 
plinary action" may be taken after a "show cause" hearing); see also Kleiner v. 
First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193, 1209-10 (11th Cir. 1985) (ordering fine against 
counsel for intentional misconduct under inherent power); Miranda v. Southern Pac. 
Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983) (assessing fines against both attor- 
neys under local court rule); Roy v. American Professional Mktg., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 
687, 692-93 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (ordering monies to be paid to court clerk for pretri- 
al misconduct under the authority of Federal Rule .of Civil Procedure 16(0). 
98. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1558-61 (11th Cir. 1987). 
99. For an early view, see Michael S. Cooper, Comment, Financial Penalties 
Imposed Directly Against Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the Contempt 
Power, 26 UCLA L. REV. 855, 882-91 (1979). 
100. See, e.g., Warshay v. G u i ~ e s s  PLC, 750 F. Supp. 628, 639-41 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990), af'd, 935 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1991). In one unusual case, the trial court 
ordered fmes while granting a motion for fees, but lowered their amounts because 
those assessed "were likely unaware that such a sanction might be imposed." Advo 
Sys., Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 
101. In one federal circuit, fines against attorneys for trial court misconduct 
must be accompanied by procedural protections under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 46(c), see discussion supra note 97, which requires a hearing and an 
opportunity to show cause. Miranda, 710 F.2d at 522-23. 
102. Some decisions have expressly employed an hourly rate for a court's time. 
Advo Sys., 110 F.R.D. a t  433 (six hundred dollars). Other courts have not em- 
ployed an hourly rate. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Stern, 136 F.R.D. 63, 78 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (hding  that improper conduct consumed equivalent of two court 
days); Olga's Kitchen of Hayward, Inc. v. Papo, 108 F.R.D. 695, 711 (E.D. Mich. 
1985), af'd in part an& rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1987) (one-thousand- 
dollar fine ordered without explanation of source of amount, but with references to 
wasted judicial resources). 
103. See Parness, supra note 52, at 1313 (raising equal treatment questions 
where courts fail to explain why only partial reimbursement is ordered and where 
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the costs incurred in handling frivolous papers. Punitive fines 
typically seek to  deter future misconduct, where the amount is 
unconnected to wasted judicial  resource^.'^ 
B. Fines Under the New Rule 11 
In inviting increasing fines, the drafters of the 1993 rule 
provided some guidance on the applicable procedural and sub- 
stantive standards. The new rule expressly mandates that 
there be "notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond" prior 
to the imposition of any sanction.'" Clearly, fines can be or- 
dered upon notice of, and an opportunity to  respond to, a court- 
initiated inquiry into Rule 11 miscond~ct;'~~ perhaps they can 
also follow a hearing on a private party's motion for sanc- 
tions,''' though such motions will be infrequent.lo8 Further, 
the 1993 rules indicate a sanction order must be accompanied 
by a description of the conduct determined to  violate the 
rule,'0g as well as an explanation of "the basis for the sanc- 
tion imposed,"'1° whether requested or not. 
At least six major issues face federal judges who seek to  
fine attorneys presenting frivolous papers under the 1993 rule: 
guidelines are nonexistent); Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 
548 (4th Cir. 1990) (willingness to endorse awards of only "nominal court expenses 
not provided for in 28 U.S.C. 3 1920," since guidelines for larger awards should be 
' 
reserved for legislation), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). 
104. See, e.g., Warshay, 750 F. Supp. at  640 (imposing fme to deter "abusive 
litigation practices"); Robeson Defense Cornm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650, 660 
(E.D.N.C. 1989) (imposing $10,000 fine on each of three lawyers to deter others 
and to punish), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 
525 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that fines were based improperly on out of court con- 
siderations), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). 
105. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 580 (Rule ll(c)). 
106. Id. at 582 (Rule Il(cXl)(B)) (indicates a "show cause" order should de- 
scribe "the sp&c conduct that appears to violate" the rule). 
107. With both court initiatives and party motions, notice must be given of 
"the specific conduct that appears to violate" the rule; attorneys' fees are to be 
awarded only where "warranted" and are not preferred; and, trial judges have 
"significant discretion." Id. at 581-82 (Rule ll(cXl)(A), (B)). 
108. The rule drafters indicated that a party may only be awarded attorneys' 
fees after a safe harbor has been provided and where fees are necessary to deter 
repetition of the "conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Id. 
at  582 (Rule ll(cX2)). Movants for fees will likely stress their opponents presented 
papers for improper purposes, "such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation." Id. at  580 (Rule 11 (bX1)). With the ex- 
pected drop in Rule 11 motions, fines should increasingly be dependent upon court 
"initiative." Id. at  582 (Rule ll(c)(l)(B)). 
109. Id. at 583 (Rule 11 (cX3)). 
110. Id. 
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(1) the manner in which the judges will become informed about 
possible lawyer misconduct, since there will be fewer Rule 11 
movants; (2) the additional procedures necessary before fines 
can be levied; (3) the type of conduct for which Rule 11 fines 
might be imposed; (4) who will pay the fine; (5) the manner in 
which federal trial courts will employ the uncontrolled discre- 
tion afforded them in the 1993 rule to fine attorneys; and (6) 
the uncertain relationship between Rule 11 proceedings and 
other public interest proceedings, such as  bar disciplinary ac- 
tions, which can involve the very same litigation misconduct. 
1. Learning of lawyer misconduct 
With fewer Rule 11 motions, how will judges learn of attor- 
ney misconduct which might prompt a fine? One solution is to 
mandate (or a t  least encourage) those involved in civil litiga- 
tion to report their beliefs about si@cant Rule 11 attorney 
misconduct which will not otherwise likely be subject to any 
court initiative or motion. The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct for lawyers already require reports to disciplinary 
agencies when substantial questions are raised about another 
lawyer's conduct."' A reporting rule for serious Rule 11 mis- 
conduct could easily be incorporated into local federal court 
rules, which could require, for example, reports of especially 
egregious conduct that has been withdrawn or corrected during 
a safe harbor period.ll2 
Such a reporting rule would not interfere with bar disci- 
plinary responsibilities. l3 Additionally, it would address 
somewhat Justice Scalia's concerns in opposing the 1993 rule. 
Scalia urged that the net effect of the new standard would be 
"to decrease the incentive on the part of the person best situat- 
111. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1992) [hereinafter 
MODEL RULES] ("A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as 
to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects 
shall inform the appropriate professional authority."); cf. rd. Rule 3.1 ("A lawyer 
shall not . . . assert . . . an issue . . . unless there is a basis for doing so that is 
not frivolous." Frivolous issues are described in the accompanying note as requiring 
an objective test.). 
112. While egregious conduct which is corrected within the safe harbor period 
may not support a fee award, nevertheless it still constitutes a violation to which 
a court may apply certain sanctions on-its initiative. See supra note 48. 
113. MODEL RULES, supra note 111, Rule 8.3 cmt. (recognizing that serious 
offenses may be referred to other agencies "more appropriate in the circumstances" 
and that less serious offenses require no bar disciplinary agency report). 
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ed to alert the court to [the] perversion of our civil justice sys- 
tem."ll4 Thus, a reporting rule could cover flagrant miscon- 
duct, such as pleadings apparently filed without any prefiling 
inquiry or motions seemingly intended to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay, even when the papers have been with- 
drawn. A mandatory reporting provision should at least encom- 
pass reports by attorneys, since they are court officers as well 
as the zealous advocates of private interests and thus are more 
justifiably subject to the courts' dictates on professional behav- 
ior. A voluntary reporting provision could also cover 
nonlawyers, particularly litigants harmed by the Rule 11 mis- 
conduct of their adversaries' attorneys. 
This reporting rule would be consistent with the intent of 
the Rule 11 reformers dating to the 1983 amendments. Profes- 
sor Arthur Miller, the reporter to the committee which primari- 
ly drafted the 1983 changes, said this about the 1983 rule 
when it first took effect: 
We have lived so long with the emphasis on "duty to client" 
that redirecting the responsibilities of lawyers to the system 
is easier said than done. Yet once it is understood that the 
court system is a societal resource, not merely the private 
.playpen of the litigants, the difficult task of discouraging 
hyperactivity must be undertaken. 
The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro- 
cedure represent a modest step in that dire~tion."~ 
2. Process of fining lawyers 
With the decrease in Rule 11 motions, what process will 
provide the required "notice a n d .  . . reasonable opportunity to 
respond"ll6 for hearings on fines under the 1993 rule? Notice 
should come pursuant to a "show cause" order issued under 
Rule 1 l(c)(l)(B), which describes the specific conduct that alleg- 
edly violates the rule.ll' Unlike past practice, notice by way 
of a private party's motion should usually be inadequate." 
As well, the notice should provide some guidance on the stan- 
dards to be applied and the procedures to be employed at the 
114. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 509. 
115. Arthur Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 19 (1985) (footnotes omitted). 
116. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 580 (Rule ll(c)). 
117. Id. at 582. 
118. Cf. supra note 100. 
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hearing. For example, it should indicate whether oral or writ- 
ten testimony will be entertained and whether discovery is 
available. llg Finally, the notice should indicate whether the 
judge might consider other public interest sanctions, including 
a reprimand, a bar disciplinary referral, or an order requiring 
participation in an educational program. Boilerplate "show 
cause" orders could easily be incorporated into local rules. 
Because hearings required for compensatory fines under 
Rule 11 seemingly trigger fewer constitutional rights than do 
hearings for punitive fines,l2' and because all conduct 
prompting a possible Rule 11 fine has caused some wasted 
judicial resources, Rule 11 fines should be limited to those 
which compensate wholly or partially for societal loss. Punitive 
fines arising from conduct violating Rule 11 are still available 
during more traditional disciplinary hearings before attorney 
regulatory commissions and the like. 
The opportunity to be heard on compensatory fines should 
vary depending upon the relevant factual and legal issues. On 
occasion, it seems appropriate for a federal judge to  appoint a 
special public representative to urge the public interest, as can 
occur in some contempt settings;l2l such a representative of- 
ten should not be an attorney otherwise involved in the law- 
The representative might be an attorney who is em- 
119. The legislative history of the 1993 rule indicates the availability of the 
opportunity for written submissions, oral arguments, or "evidentiary presentation 
will depend on the circumstances." 1993 Amendments, supm note 28, at 589 (Adv- 
isory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11) (parentheses omitted). 
120. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1559 n.10 (11th Cir. 1987) 
("It may be that the monetary sanction . . . is . . . so arguably unrelated to the 
misconduct that due process will require extensive due process safeguards."); 
Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 423 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 
1992) (stating that coercive civil contempt fines in f ~ e d  amounts not measured by 
any harm suffered by civil party may raise due process and excessive fines con- 
cerns), cert. granted sub mm. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 113 S. Ct. 
2439 (1993). 
121. In some contempt settings, appointment is required. See Young v. United 
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 809 n.21 (1987) (finding, under its 
supervisory authority, that a criminal contemner has a right to a disinterested 
prosecutor, who c a ~ o t  be the successful civil litigant whose injunction was alleged- 
ly disobeyed); see also Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1124 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1990) (finding no "concrete adverseness" as plaintiffs did not appear during 
defendants' appeal of fine payable to the court) (citation omitted); Snow Machs., 
Inc. v. Hedco, Inc., 838 F.2d 718, 726 (3d Cir. 1988) (expressing surprise that prob- 
lem of public representation in fine cases has received no attention, but offering 
"no solutions"). 
122. At times, such an attorney would have conflicting interests if appointed; 
consider settings involving unwithdrawn frivolous papers presented for an improper 
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ployed by the court in the clerk's office, or who is an assistant 
United States Attorney. If needed, compensation for such pub- 
lic representatives who normally work in the private sector 
could come from the fines earlier collected in other cases? 
Jury trials need not be c~nducted, '~~ and the burden of proof 
may need only be preponderance of the evidence? 
3. Conduct warranting fines 
What type of conduct might warrant a Rule 11 penalty 
paid into court? Seemingly, negligent presentation of frivolous 
papers alone should not suffice. Sufficient deterrents for such 
future conduct by the same or other attorneys already ex- 
ist,'" and thus fines for simple negligence should be deemed 
barred under the 1993 rule as deterrence is now to be the chief 
goal behind Rule 11 sanctions. On the other hand, intentional 
misconduc~such as presenting frivolous papers for the pur- 
pose of harassment-should always subject the wrongdoer to 
the possibility of a h e .  Fines provide an efficient tool for deter- 
ring attorneys specially and generally from future Rule 11 
violations. The economic interests which drove many attorneys 
and parties to  seek fee awards under the 1983 rule should 
prove to be quite different from the motivations of judges who 
will initiate inquiries into compensatory h e s  under the 1993 
rule. 
What of fines for misconduct which is more culpable than 
purpose, where both fines and fee awards to the attorney's clients could be urged. 
See supra note 48; see also Snow Machs., Inc., 838 F.2d at  726 n.6 (noting the 
possibility of appointing an amicus). 
123. Cf.  Joan Meier, The "Righf to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Con- 
tempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U .  L.Q. 85, 90 (1992) 
(noting the hnding problem for appointed counsel in criminal contempt cases). 
124. But see Parness, supra note 52, at  1314 (uncertainty on the need for a 
jury to assess Rule 11 punitive fines, but not for Rule 11 compensatory fines). 
125. But see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745 (1982) (discussing when 
"fair preponderance of the evidence" standard may be unconstitutional); Donaldson 
v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1559 n.10 (11th Cir. 1987) ("It may be that the monetary 
sanction being considered in a specific case is so severe in amount . . . that due 
process will require extensive due process safeguards as prerequisites to its imposi- 
tion."). 
126. Notice of an opposing party's concern about negligent presentations can 
always be served; if such presentations are not corrected, they can be stricken 
upon motion. See supra note 54. Further, reprimands and orders of continuing 
education are some of the public interest sanctions available to address such con- 
duct. See 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at  587 (Advisory Committee Note to 
1993 Rule 11). 
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negligence, but not quite in tent i~nal '~~ (however intentional 
is defined'28)? The legislative history to the 1993 rule pro- 
vides some guidance by indicating that "show cause orders will 
ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to  a con- 
tempt of court."'29 Civil contempt settings, at  least, need not 
involve allegations of bad intent.lsO Thus, compensatory fines 
under Rule 11 should be available for conduct which does not 
involve bad intent, but is serious enough that adequate deter- 
rence requires some fine payable to the court. While somewhat 
imprecise, the term "egregious misconduct" could serve as a 
guidepost. 
4. Paying the fine 
Normally, attorneys should be held personally liable for 
any compensatory fines resulting from their own presentations 
of papers deemed violative of Rule 11. Yet, recall that the 1993 
rule also now allows judges to sanction law firms of attorneys 
who have presented frivolous papers.13' Should law firms ev- 
er be assessed joint liability for the fines incurred by their law- 
yers? Should law firms ever be fined even where their responsi- 
ble p e r s o ~ e l  are not fined personally? 
When attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses are 
awarded against an attorney for presenting a Givolous paper, 
the 1993 rule provides that "[albsent exceptional circumstanc- 
es, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations 
127. In a similar setting, federal courts have divided on the standards for 
awarding attorneys' fees due to unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of litiga- 
tion under 28 U.S.C. $ 1927. Janet E. Josselyn, Note, The Song of  the Si- 
rens4anctionin.g Lazuyers Under 28 U.S.C. $ 1927, 31 B.C. L. REV. 477 (1990) 
(circuits split on negligent versus reckless or willful bad faith conduct). 
128. Cf. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1710 (1993) ("willful" 
conduct under Age Discrimination in Employment Act includes conduct showing 
reckless disregard for whether acts were prohibited by statute); Cheek v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (accused must know his conduct was illegal to attempt 
"willfully" to evade income tax). 
129. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at  592 (Advisory Committee Note to 
1993 Rule 11). 
130. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (holding bad 
intent not a prerequisite to civil contempt). 
131. Specifically, Rule ll(cX1XA) allows sanctions against "law firms . . . that 
. . . are responsible for the violation." 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, a t  580-81; 
see also Edward A. Adams, Bar: Discipline Rules Should Cover Firms, NAT'L L.J., 
July 5, 1993, at  10 (A committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York has urged that the New York attorney disciplinary rules should be extended 
to cover law firms.). 
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committed by its partners, associates, and  employee^."'^^ Ad- 
ditionally, the 1993 rule expressly permits court initiatives on 
public interest sanctions to be directed to law firms regarding 
all forms of Rule 11  violation^.'^^ The legislative history to 
the new rule further indicates that ordinarily, law firm respon- 
sibility for its agents' misconduct is to follow "established prin- 
ciples of agency."134 Thus, the 1993 rule clearly warrants that  
in most instances joint liability be assigned law firms for com- 
pensatory fines levied against their pers0nne1.l~~ 
The joint responsibility of law firms for such compensatory 
fines would also promote one of the major goals behind the 
1993 rule, the additional deterrence of Rule 11 attorney mis- 
conduct. The 1993 amendment expressly provides that Rule 11 
sanctions are to be "limited to what is sufficient to deter repeti- 
tion of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated."136 With law firm liability, not only will law firms 
have some economic incentive to better monitor their personnel 
so that frivolous papers are not presented by their offices, but 
they will also have greater incentives to monitor internal oper- 
ations so as to avoid federal court inquiry into how the firms' 
policies and practices may have led to frivolous paper presenta- 
tions. Additionally, attorneys will become more concerned about 
exposing others to the costs of their own sins. 
Under the 1983 rule, trial courts occasionally sought to 
motivate reforms within law firms in order to reduce the chanc- 
es of future Rule 11 misconduct. For example, one judge or- 
dered that his opinion finding a Rule 11 violation in the ways 
in which legal memoranda had been prepared be circulated 
among all partners and associates of the law firms employing 
the errant lawyers.137 Presumedly, the hope, in part, was to 
stimulate debate on, and facilitate any necessary changes to, 
the firm's established approach to legal memoranda.ls8 
132. 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at  581 (Rule ll(c)(l)(A)). 
133. Id. at 582 (Rule ll(c)(l)(B)). 
134. Id. at 589 (Advisory Committee Note to 1993 Rule 11). 
135. The rule further allows sanctions against individuals and law fwms who 
helped others present frivolous papers, though they themselves did not "actually" 
make the presentations. Id. 
136. Id. at 582 (Rule ll(cX2)). 
137. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D. 
Cal. 1984), reu'd on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986). 
138. Elsewhere, this federal judge has written: 
The impact of a reprimand is greatly increased by including it in a pub- 
lished order. Publication enhances the deterrent effect of sanctions and 
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Furthermore, at times under the 1993 rule, compensatory 
fines should be levied upon law firms even where there are no 
parallel fines upon any individuals. It is easily imaginable that 
the fining of a law firm might be the most effective deterrent to 
the repetition of misconduct by those within the firm, while 
other sanctions, such as bar disciplinary referrals or  repri- 
mands or required continuing legal education, would be most 
effective in deterring the repetition of the conduct by the indi- 
vidual attorney involved. As contrasted with the 1983 rule 
which urged individual attorneys t o  stop and think about their 
litigation papers before signing them, the 1993 rule should 
prompt trial judges to urge law firms to stop and think about 
their internal practices which may have contributed to the 
presentation of a frivolous paper. 
5. Uncontrolled discretion to fine 
Yet another difficulty facing courts contemplating compen- 
satory fines of lawyers under the 1993 rule is how to exercise 
wisely the delegated discretion as to  process and substance. "Of 
course, discretion . . . is an integral element of the litigation 
process . . . . Such discretion is necessary if trial judges are to 
manage the litigation before them effe~tively."'~~ Neverthe- 
less, discretion which is too broad can cause unfortunate and 
avoidable differences in treatment of similarly situated people, 
as well as a lack of fair notice of what is required. These prob- 
lems can be avoided with the adoption of a few local court 
rules.'40 Such local rules seem preferable to allowing a 
"shakedown period" on fines, characterized as "a bell-shaped 
curve of litigation activity responsive to  rule change," which 
helps educate the bar about what is expected of them under Rule 
11 . . . . Publication can . . . [be achieved] by distribution of copies of the 
order to other lawyers in the sanctioned firm. 
William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 
104 F.R.D. 181, 202 (1985). Recall as well that in the fall of 1990, the Chicago 
Bar Association said that possible sanctions under Rule 11 should include require- 
ments that law firms "institute internal approval procedures to assure that future 
filings comply with the rule." Comment of Chicago Bar, supra note 67, a t  12. 
139. Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 1017 n.22. 
140. The wisdom of the 1993 rulemakers in not promulgating a "uniform ap- 
proach" to fines is not addressed herein. Evidently, they believed a single approach 
was not desirable "given that the district courts vary tremendously in size, volume 
of cases, calendar congestion, and types of cases, and that litigation tactics of at- 
torneys may differ across the country." Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 
557, 569-70 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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"peaks and then declines to normality as the profession's un- 
derstanding of the rule is ~tabilized."'~' The local rules could 
address both the procedural and substantive aspects of Rule 11 
practice, serving to promote uniformity within the district. The 
aforedescribed reporting duties,'42 boilerplate notices of court 
initiatives,'" and differentiation between nonegregious and 
egregious mi~conduct,'~~ as well as other matters, could all be 
addressed through local rules. Experience under the 1993 rule 
should prompt reformulations of the local rules over time; fur- 
ther, local rules might be changed to accommodate the differ- 
ences found in the federal districts or to  try new approaches to  
perennial problems. 
6. Varying mechanisms which address frivolous litigation 
papers in the federal district courts 
A final problem confronting judges considering the imposi- 
tion of compensatory fines on misconducting attorneys under 
the 1993 rule involves the role to be assigned other remedial 
mechanisms which can also address Rule 11 misconduct. The 
drafters of the new rule were certainly aware of these other 
mechanisms and of the difficulties they posed to trial judges 
acting pursuant to the 1983 rule; but the 1993 rulemakers 
failed generally t o  address the relationships.'" In particular, 
given the federal rulemakers' express approval of bar disciplin- 
ary referrals as a form of Rule 11 sanction, the relationship 
between fines and referrals merits some attention. 
In some instances, Rule 11 misconduct should prompt (or 
prompt in the alternative) referrals to  traditional disciplinary 
141. Call for Comments, supra note 24, at 346. 
142. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
143. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text. 
145. In fad, the federal rulemakers in 1990 welcomed "comment and sugges- 
tions with respect to the relationship amongst . . . several sources of sanctions 
law." Call for Comments, supm note 24, at  350. In the end, they deemed the 1993 
rule inapplicable to discovery, 1993 Amendments, supra note 28, at 583 (Rule 
ll(d)), but otherwise indicated the 1993 rule would continue to operate simulta- 
neously with other sanctioning authority, Id. at 592 (Advisory Committee Note to  
1993 Rule 11). Their interim report, published after their 1990 call for comments, 
said: "Some unification of the various rules authorizing sanctions may be desirable; 
however, creation of a single rule for sanctions may not be appropriate in view of 
the different situations to which they are addressed." Interim Report, supra note 
25, at  1-23. For a proposal of a single rule covering all abusive condud in litiga- 
tion, see The Committee on Federal Courts, Comments on Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 and Related Rules, 46 REC. ASS% BAR CITY N.Y. 267, 299-302 (1991). 
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agencies for consideration of legal practice restrictions. In the 
past, there have been some referrals of Rule 11 misconduct to 
these agencies. When referrals have been made, the recipients 
have usually been state disciplinary agencies, not the disciplin- 
ary panels established within the federal courts;146 this seems 
a bit odd given the significant federal interest in civil litigation 
misconduct in federal courts that is often defined by standards 
quite different than those governing civil practice in the state 
courts. Further, a few federal judges have acted under the 1983 
rule as their own trial court's disciplinarian by seeking to sus- 
pend from practice,14' or otherwise to restrict the practice op- 
portunities of,14' misconducting attorneys without referrals 
either to their own court's disciplinary process or to the rele- 
vant state disciplinary. agency. In many ways, such vigdante 
discipline is comparable to the assessment of punitive fines 
under Rule 11. As contrasted with compensatory fines which 
primarily seek both to compensate and to deter and which can 
address less than very egregious misbehavior, punitive fines, 
like legal practice restrictions, are essentially concerned with 
deterrence and with very egregious misconduct. 
Of course, at least some of the problems caused by these 
referral differences and by vigdante discipline could be alleviat- 
ed with the establishment of "uniform federal rules of federal 
litigation conduct backed up by uniform federal enforcement 
146. See, e.g., Greenfield v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 146 F.R.D. 118, 
128-29 (ED. Pa. 1993) (referring to state agency, though court notes local federal 
rules on professional conduct may have been violated). On occasion, referrals are 
made by appellate courts when Rule 11 misconduct at  the trial level persists in 
the same case on appeal. See, e.g., Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 474 US. 827 (1985); see also Cannon v. Loyola Univ., 676 F. Supp. 
823, 831 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (referring attorney to both the state and the federal 
trial court disciplinary bodies in civil contempt proceeding arising out of attempts 
to enforce earlier Rule 11 monetary sanctions), and vacated on other grounds, 687 
F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
147. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1985) 
(issuing "show cause" order on suspension from legal practice); cf. Piazza v. Carson 
City, 652 F. Supp. 1394, 1395 (D. Nev. 1987) (holding that 1983 rule does not 
contemplate disbarment as an appropriate sanction). 
148. See, e-g., Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 137 F.R.D. 646, 656 n.9, 657 (N.D. Tex. 
1991) (removing attorney from case, but not suspending him from practicing law in 
the district); Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650, 660 (E.DN.C. 1989) 
(prohibiting attorneys from practicing in the trial court until Rule 11 monetary 
sanctions are paid), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 
505, 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); American Auto. Ass'n 
v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (placing name of attorney in 
special file). 
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mechanisms."149 Further discussion is needed on the interface 
between a federal trial court's disciplinary power, a state disci- 
plinary agency's authority and the power of a single federal 
judge to impose fines and other public interest remedies for 
conduct violating Rule 11 .I5' 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 1993 amendments to Federal Civil Rule 11 invite 
fewer private interest sanctions, such as attorneys' fee awards, 
and more public interest sanctions, such as fines payable to the 
court. This move raises difficult procedural and substantive 
questions. To a large extent, these questions cannot be an- 
swered by examining the legislative history of the 1993 rule or 
the fines imposed under earlier versions of the rule. New guide- 
lines for fines payable to the court are needed. Such guidelines 
should distinguish between compensatory and punitive fines 
and be integrated with other public interest sanctions such as 
bar disciplinary referrals. In many ways, the 1993 rule pres- 
ents some new forms of the "stop-and-think" standard; it focus- 
es on stopping and thinking by lawyers after papers have been 
presented, not before, and focuses on stopping and thinking by 
law firms about the relationships, if any, between their inter- 
nal practices and any frivolous papers presented by them to 
federal courts. Debate on the new Rule 11 should begin soon so 
that the surge in fines paid to federal district courts dter  De- 
cember 1993 is handled fairly and efficiently. 
149. Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging 
Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 977 (1992). Prob- 
lems could also be reduced with the creation of a "national bar." Id. at 974. 
150. See, e,g., Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 550 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (where "an attorney's conduct does not threaten the orderly administra- 
tion of justice in the courtroom," trial court should refer the attorney to the disci- 
plinary mechanism established by local court rule), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 
(1991). 
